We will look at the major phases
of the incident response process, preparation, detection & analysis,
containment, eradication, and recovery, and
post-incident activity in detail. Since this may be a review for many of
you, I will point out key requirements. For a full list, you can consult
either the previous course, or the NIST Incident Handling Guide. Preparation, incident response
methodologies typically emphasize preparation. Not only establishing an incident
response capability, so that the organization is ready
to respond to incidents. But also preventing incidents by
ensuring the systems, networks, and applications are sufficiently secure. Let's review some of the basic
requirements of the preparation phase. Incident handler communication facilities, as you look at the case
studies in this course, and as you are preparing to put together your
own case study, it is important to look at where organizations may have failed
to meet these basic requirements. Contact information on call information,
what if you suddenly cannot get to your cell phone data, your tablet, or
laptop that this information is stored on? Will you be able to contact the
information needed to successfully reach your teams? Just something to think about as
you prepare for incident response. You also need to be able to
report status on an incident. This is important to quickly engage the
right resources if your organization is suffering from a cyber attack. Do you have a secure war room to
gather the right people in the event you need the skills and multiple people? And where will you store any forensic
evidence if your organization is later called to produce evidence in
the event of a data breach? All of these questions need to be
answered prior to a security incident arises within your organization. You will need to have the right incident
analysis hardware and software. You will need spare workstations
servers and networking equipment, or the virtualized equivalence,
which may be used for purposes such as restoring backups,
and trying out malware. Packet sniffers and protocol analyzers
are also needed to capture and analyze network traffic. These are just some of the few examples
of what you will need from a hardware and software perspective. And finally,
review your incident analysis resources. Do you have network diagrams and
list of critical assets? Cryptographic hashes for critical files,
and access to images of clean OS and application installations for possible
restoration and recovery purposes. Incidents can occur in countless ways, so it is infeasible to develop step by step
instructions for handling every incident. Organizations should be generally
prepared to handle any incidents, but should focus on being prepared to handle
incidents that are common attack vectors. The attack vectors listed, but not intended to provide definitive
classifications for incidents. Rather, they simply list common methods of
attack, which can be used as the basis for defining more specific
handling procedures. Attrition, which is an attack that employs
brute-force methods to compromise, degrade, or destroy systems,
networks, or services. Brute-force attacks against
an authentication mechanism, such as passwords, is common. You should also look at email attacks, which is an attack that it's executed be
it in an email message, or attachment. For example, exploit code designed
as an attached document, or a link to a malicious site in
the body of an email message. We will explore these attack vectors, as
well as a couple of other attack vectors, as you proceed through this course. A couple of other attack methods
that we have not talked about could pertain to lost or
theft of equipment. The loss or theft of a computing device or
media used by an organization, such as a laptop, smartphone, or authentication token should be reported
to the organization immediately, and handle this part of your
security incident handling. Also, an attack that does not fit
into any of these other categories. How will your incident response team
handle any attacks that have not been identified and step-by-step procedures
written for many organizations? The most challenging part of the incident
response process is accurately detecting and
assessing possible incidents. Determine whether
an incident has occurred. And if so, the type and extent and
magnitude of the problem. This will become clear in multiple
case studies within this course. What makes this so challenging is
a combination of three factors. Incidence may be detected
through many different means with varying levels of detail. The volume of potential signs of
incidence is typically high, and deep specialized technical knowledge and
extensive experience are necessary for proper and efficient analysis
of incident related data. Signs of an incident fall into one of two
categories, precursors and indicators. A precursor is a sign that
an incident may occur in the future. An indicator is assigned that
an incident may have occurred, or may be occurring now. If precursors are detected, the organization may have an opportunity
to prevent the incident by altering its security posture to save
a target from attack. Examples are web server log
entries that showed the usage of a vulnerability scanner, a threat from a group stating that
the group will attack the organization. While precursors are relatively rare,
indicators are all too common. An indicator might involve
anti-software alerts, which it detects that a host
is infected with malware. An application log with multiple failed
login attempts from an unfamiliar remote system. Or a network administrator notices
an unusual deviation from typical network traffic flows. Incident detection and analysis
would be easy if every precursor and indicator were guaranteed to be accurate. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Intrusion detection systems may produce
false positives, or incorrect indicators. What makes incident detection analysis so
difficult, each indicator ideally should be evaluated
to determine if it's legitimate. The total number of indicators may
be thousands or millions per day. Finding the real security incidents that
occurred out of all the indicators can be a daunting task. Preparation and execution frameworks,
which will provide additional defense to further attackers is
essential part of the preparation phase. In the next video, we will review the IBM
X-Force Iris cyberattack preparation and execution frameworks, which will provide
additional defense tip for attacks. An essential part of
containment is decision-making. Should we shut down the system? Should we disconnect from a network, or
disable certain functions on a network? Such decisions are much easier to make
if they are predetermined strategies and procedures for containing the incident. Containment strategies vary,
based on the type of incident. Criteria for determining the appropriate
strategy include potential damage to, and theft of resources,
need for evidence preservation. Time and resources needed to implement the
strategy, and duration of this solution. Are there emergency workarounds? Are there temporary workarounds
to be removed in two weeks? Is there a permanent solution? In certain cases, some organizations
redirect all of the primary reason for gathering evidence during an incident
is to resolve the incident. It may also be needed for
legal proceedings. Evidence should be collected according to
procedures that meet all applicable laws and regulations that have been developed
from previous discussions with legal staff, and
appropriate law enforcement agencies, so then any evidence can
be admissible in court. After an incident has been contained, eradication may be necessary to
eliminate components of the incident. Such as deleting malware and
disabling breached user accounts, as well as identifying and mitigating
all vulnerabilities that were exploited. One of the most important parts of
incident response is also the most often omitted, learning and improving. Each incident response team should
evolve to reflect new threats, improve technology, and lessons learned. Small incidents need limited post-incident
analysis, with the exception of incidents performed through new attack methods that
are of widespread concern and interest. After serious attacks have occurred, it
is usually worthwhile to hold post-mortem meetings that cross team and
organizational boundaries. Provide a mechanism for
information sharing. Organizations should establish policy for how long evidence from
an incident should be retained. Most organizations choose to
retain all evidence for months or years after the incident ends. Next, we will review the use of
the cyberattack preparation and execution framework developed
by the IBM X-Force Iris team.